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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SEARCHING PERSONAL EFFECTS OF A VISITOR
TO THE PREMISES WHERE A VALID SEARCH WARRANT IS BEING EXE-
CUTED-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that police
may search the personal effects of a visitor (not on the person) to
the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant to search the
premises if the personal effects were a part of the general content
of the room and a plausible repository for the object of the search.
Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 549 A.2d 909 (1988).
On March 22, 1985, members of the Pennsylvania State Police
Drug Law Enforcement Division executed a search warrant at 93
Main Street, Apt. D., in Luzerne, Pennsylvania.1 The warrant au-
thorized police to search for cocaine, other controlled substances
and any paraphernalia and records associated with the distribution
of controlled substances.2 The scope of the search warrant included
a search of the premises and the person of Tina Cosgrove, an occu-
pant of Apt. D.' The search warrant and affidavit of probable
cause stated that Appellee Timothy Reese was an associate of Cos-
grove's, that he had been observed in Apt. D. on previous occa-
sions, was a known drug user and had been the target of law en-
forcement investigations." After entering the apartment police
found Cosgrove and Reese in the kitchen.5 The officers read the
1. Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 549 A.2d 909 (1988).
2. Id. at 909.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 910, n.1. The affidavit of probable cause stated in pertinent part: "According
to confidential informant, one Timothy Reese, an associate of Cosgrove has been observed in
Apt. D at the 93 Main Street address. Reese is a known drug user and has been the target of
law enforcement investigations of the Region VIII Strike Force at Kingston." Id. Pennsylva-
nia Rule of Criminal Procedure 2003 provides the requirements for issuance of search war-
rants. The relevant portion of Rule 2003 provides: "No search warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority."
Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 2003. Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances set forth in the
search warrant affidavit are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that contraband to be seized is in the specific place covered in the application. Common-
wealth v. Frye, 242 Pa. Super 144, 363 A.2d 1201 (1976).
5. 549 A.2d at 910. Also present in the apartment during the search were Mrs. Cos-
grove's three children and another adult, Jerome Dunbar, who was in the living room. Com-
monwealth v. Reese, Court of Common Please of Luzerne County, Opinion No. 691 of 1985.
There is a discrepancy as to the number of persons present when the search was initiated
because Appellant's Brief states that, "present were Tina Cosgrove, three of Tina Cosgrove's
children, two adult males and Appellee, Timothy Reese." Brief for Appellant at 6.
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search warrant to Cosgrove and Reese and began the search.'
During the search, Officer Carl Allen was assigned to watch Cos-
grove and Reese in the kitchen. Officer Allen notice a black
leather jacket draped over a kitchen chair approximately four feet
from where he was standing.' Without knowing to whom the jacket
belonged, Officer Allen decided to search the jacket, suspecting
that it might contain contraband or weapons.' Upon searching the
jacket the Officer found a pair of "brass knuckles."10 Reese ac-
knowledged ownership of the jacket and was subsequently arrested
and charged under the Crimes Code with possession of a prohib-
ited weapon.1"
Reese's Attorney filed a motion to suppress evidence of the
"brass knuckles" which was denied by the suppression court after
a hearing.1 2 The "brass knuckles" were admitted into evidence at
6. 549 A.2d at 910. The search warrant was read to the resident of the apartment,
Mrs. Cosgrove. Court of Common Please of Luzerne County, Opinion No. 691 of 1985 at 2.
All adults were made aware of the purpose of the search and that controlled substances were
subsequently found. Brief for Appellant at 6.
7. 549 A.2d at 910.
8. Id. There is a discrepancy as to who was four feet from the coat. The Superior
Court's opinion states that Reese was some four feet from the coat. 520 A.2d at 491. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision states that the coat was about four feet from Officer
Allen. 549 A.2d at 911. The Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, opinion states that
Reese was only a few feet from the jacket when it was seized. Court of Common Pleas of
Luzerne County Opinion No. 691 of 1985, at 3.
9. 549 A.2d at 910. Officer Allen testified that he decided to search the jacket "be-
cause it's a common place where either contraband could be hidden or weapons." Id., (Notes
of Testimony at p. 39 September 17, 1985).
10. 549 A.2d at 910.
11. Id. After finding the "brass knuckles" Officer Allen stated: "Look what I found!"
One of the officers then pointed to Reese and said: "Is that your jacket?" Reese replied:
"Yes." Brief for Appellant at 6. Ownership of the jacket was further established by the fact
that when Reese left the apartment in the company of police he voluntarily took and wore
the jacket from which the knuckles were removed. Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne
County, Opinion No. 691 of 1985 at 3. Reese was charged under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
908 (Purdon 1983). The relevant portion of section 908 provides:
(a) Offense defined-A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if, except as
authorized by law, he makes, repairs, sells, ot otherwise deals in, uses, or possesses
any offensive weapon. (c) Definition-As used in this section "offensive weapon"
means any bomb. . . metal knuckles, or other implement for the infliction of serious
bodily injury which serves no common lawful purpose.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 908 (Purdon 1983).
12. 549 A.2d at 910. A timely motion to suppress evidence was made by Reese's Attor-
ney at the preliminary hearing argument. Brief for Appellant at 3. Rule 323 of the Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for a motion to suppress evidence. The relevant
portion of Rule 323 states: "The defendant or his attorney may make a motion to the court
to suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant's
rights." PA. R. CriM. PROc. 323. Furthermore, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution must be
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trial and Reese was found guilty by a jury of possessing a prohib-
ited offensive weapon. 3
Reese's motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were
denied by the trial judge."1 Reese was subsequently sentenced to
two and one-half months to twenty-three and one-half months
imprisonment. 5
Reese appealed his judgment of conviction to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court.'6 The Superior Court held that the search of the
jacket was not within the scope of the warrant since the circum-
stances pointed to the conclusion that it belonged to Reese and not
to Cosgrove and was not logically part of the contents of the
room.1 7 The court noted that Reese, and not Cosgrove, was asked
excluded at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Reese's motion to suppress was denied
on September 11, 985. Brief for Appellant at 3.
13. 549 A.2d at 910. Reese was found guilty of possessing a prohibited weapon on
September 17, 1985 and sentenced to prison. Id., See infra, text.
14. Id. Reese's motion in arrest of judgment and/or for a new trial was timely made to
the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. Reese alleged (6) reasons in support of his
motion contending that the court improperly denied the following: 1) motion to suppress
evidence; 2) demurrer on the charge of Prohibited Offensive Weapons; 3) motion to seques-
ter the chief prosecutor; 4) motion in Limine to prohibit the Commonwealth from using his
prior criminal record for impeachment purposes; and 5) the Court erred when failed as re-
quested to charge the jury that direct proof that the accused knew of the knuckles was
required, and finally; 6) the Court's instructions to the jury concerning Reese's affirmative
defenses infringed upon his Fifth Amendment rights. The motion in arrest of judgment and/
or for a new trial was denied on December 17, 1985 and Reese was scheduled for sentencing
on January 17, 1986. The Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County reasoned that the
suppression judge appropriately considered the search and seizure of the "brass knuckles"
to be within the scope of the search warrant for the premises in denying the motion to
suppress evidence. In denying the demurrer the court held the evidence was sufficient to
establish that Reese had the power to control the knuckles and the intent to exercise that
control. In denying the motion to sequester Officer Allen while another Trooper testified,
the court reasoned that the denial did not impair defense counsel's ability to cross examine
either of the witnesses. The court held the motion in limine to prohibit the Commonwealth
from using Reese's prior burglary conviction was properly denied since the conviction was a
proper subject for impeachment and the Commonwealth had no other means to directly
impeach Reese if he testified. The court also contended that the jury instructions ade-
quately defined the elements of the offense involved and the Commonwealth's burden. Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the availa-
bility of affirmative defenses did not create a negative inference concerning Reese's failure
to testify thus infringing upon his Fifth Amendment rights. Court of Common Pleas of
Luzerne County, Opinion No. 691 of 1985.
15. 549 A.2d at 910. Reese was sentenced on January 17, 1986. Brief for Appellant at
3.
16. 549 A.2d at 910. Reese presented the Superior Court with six issues, See supra
note 14. The Superior Court ruled solely on Reese's allegation that the suppression court
improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence. By disposing of this issue the court felt
no need to address the others listed in Footnote 14. 520 A.2d at 492.
17. Id. at 493.
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about ownership of the jacket.18 The court opined that it was clear
that the police anticipated that the jacket belonged to Reese and
not to the residents i.e., Cosgrove or her three children.' 9 The court
also noted that the police were aware of Reese's status, i.e., a visi-
tor of Cosgrove's, and not a resident since he was mentioned in the
affidavit of probable cause.2" The Superior Court vacated the judg-
ment of sentence and ruled that the suppression court erred in ad-
mitting the evidence of the "brass knuckles."'"
The Commonwealth petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
for allocatur which the court granted.22 The issue before the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court was whether the search of the personal
effects of a visitor (not on the visitor's person) were within the
scope of a warrant to search the apartment for drugs and other
contraband.2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by citing
the pertinent portions of the United States and Pennsylvania Con-
stitutions concerning search and seizure.2 ' The court stated that
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. '25 Similarly, the court stated that the Pennsyl-
18. Id. After finding the "brass knuckles," Officer Allen stated: "Look what I found!"
One of the Officers then pointed at Reese and said: "Is that your jacket?" Reese replied:
"Yes." Brief for Appellant at 6.
19. 520 A.2d at 493.
20. Id. at 492.
21. Id. at 493. The judgment of sentence was vacated January 29, 1987. Id. Exclusion
of evidence at trial occurs because of the exclusionary rule which states that evidence ob-
tained as a result of an illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment of
the U.S. Constitution must be excluded at trial. This rule was made applicable to state
court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Rule 323 of the PA. R. CRIM. PROC.
permits the defendant to move for legal suppression of illegally obtained evidence. PA. R.
CRIM. PROc. 323.
22. Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 549 A.2d 909 (1988). Allocatur was granted
on October 29, 1987, Per Curiam. Brief for Appellant at 3. Justice Larsen wrote the majority
opinion of the court which was joined by Justices Flaherty, McDermott, Papadakos and
Stout. 549 A.2d 909. Chief Justice Nix filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Zappala.
549 A.2d at 912.
23. Id. at 909.
24. Id. at 910.
25. Id. The Fourth Amendment provides in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
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vania Constitution requires that "no warrant to search a place or
to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as
nearly as may be, nor without probable cause."26 The Supreme
Court noted that the major purposes of the particularly require-
ment is to prevent general searches."
Relying on Maryland v. Garrison,28 the Court stated that the
framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to prohibit wide ranging
exploratory searches.2 9
The Supreme Court previously held in Commonwealth v.
Reece"° that a visitor's presence in a private residence where a
search warrant was being executed does not by itself authorize a
search of that visitor's person."' The Court further found in Com-
monwealth v. Platou32 that there was no constitutional difference
between a search of a visitor's person and a search of a visitor's
personal effects (not on the person) located on the premises where
a search warrant is being executed. 3 In a reversal of precedent, the
26. 549 A.2d at 910. Article I of Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
in full:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const. art. 1 § 8.
27. 549 A.2d at 910.
28. 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
29. 549 A.2d at 910. The court quoted Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987)., in
support of the proposition that the purpose of the particularly requirement is to "ensure
that the search will be carefully tailored . . . and will not take on the character of the wide
ranging exploratory searches the framers [of the U.S. Constitution] intended to prohibit."
480U.S. 84, 107 S. Ct. 1017, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 80.
30. 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970). In Reece, police were executing a search warrant
for-a suspected "pot party." 263 A.2d at 464. Reece, a visitor, entered the apartment while
the search was being conducted. Id. Police had no independent information concerning
Reece at this time and nothing suggested he was on drugs. Id. at 465. Upon entering the
apartment Reece was immediately read his "Miranda" warnings and in a subsequent search
of his person police found marijuana. Id. The Supreme Court found that the police had no
probable cause to arrest Reece and the subsequent search of his person was unlawful. Id. at
466. Reece will be discussed in greater detail, infra.
31. 549 A.2d at 910.
32. 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973). In Platou, the defendant was a guest in the apart-
ment of a friend. 312 A.2d at 31. A search warrant that authorized a search of the premises
had been issued without any information concerning defendant. Id. at 33. While executing
the warrant, police were put on notice that a certain suitcase belonged to defendant (a visi-
tor) and was not under the control of the occupant. Id. at 32. Nevertheless, police searched
the suitcase, found marijuana and subsequently arrested the defendant. Id. at 31. The Su-
preme Court found the search of the visitor's suitcase unlawful. Id. at 34. Platou is dis-
cussed in greater detail, infra.
33. 549 A.2d at 910.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there is a constitutional
difference between the search of a visitor's person and the search
of a visitor's personal effects (property not on the person) which
are located on the premises where a search warrant is being exe-
cuted.34 Having found the aforesaid constitutional difference, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly overruled Platou.
35
Citing a United States Supreme Court decision, United States v.
Ross,"8 the Court reasoned that the scope of a search warrant (that
adequately describes the place to be searched or things to be
seized) is defined by the object of the search and the places in
which there is probable cause to believe that the object may be
found.37 The Court further reasoned that property which is part of
the general content of the premises being searched and a plausible
repository for the object of the search is within the scope of the
warrant even though the property may be the personal property of
a visitor to the premises. s8 The Court stated that it would be im-
possible for police when executing a warrant where visitors are pre-
sent to distinguish between belongings of the occupants and visi-
tors in deciding what to search. 9 The Court reasoned that once a
legitimate search is undertaken, nice distinctions between closets,
drawers and containers give way to the efficient completion of the
search."° Justice Larsen stated that to require police to ask individ-
uals located on the premises to be searched whether they owned
various items of personal property would not be reasonable. 41 Nor
would it be reasonable, the Justice stated, to expect an appropriate
response if police were required to inquire into such matters before
34. Id.
35. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "Since we now believe there is a con-
stitutional difference between the search of a visitor's person and the search of visitor's
personal property (property which is not on the person) located on premises where a search
warrant is being executed, we overrule our decision in Platou. Id.
36. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when police have
probable cause to search an entire vehicle they may conduct a warrantless search of every
part of the vehicle that may conceal an object of the search. 456 U.S. at 825. The scope of
the search is thus defined by the object of the search and includes any place in which there
is probable cause to believe the object may be found. Id. at 824.
37. 549 A.2d at 911.
38. Id
39, Id.
40. Id., (quoting, United States v.Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-822, (1982)). The court's
exact language is as follows: "When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose
and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers and
containers, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task
at hand." See supra, note 36 and accompanying text.
41. 549 A.2d at 911.
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initiating their search.'2 Justice Larsen further opined that requir-
ing such a rule could easily allow visitors to frustrate a search by
either placing contraband among their unworn personal effects or
claiming ownership of personal effects and thus placing them be-
yond the scope of the warrant.4
The Reese Court also held that pursuant to a lawful search war-
rant, the search of Reese's jacket was justified since the jacket was
part of the general content of the room and was a plausible reposi-
tory for the object of the search."'
In so holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the or-
der of the Superior Court which suppressed evidence of the "brass
knuckles."' "4 The case was remanded to the Superior Court for dis-
position of the remaining issues which were preserved for appellate
review.' a
The dissenting opinion47 contended that there was no legitimate
reason to extend a valid search warrant of the premises to personal
property of a visitor to the premises and that the principle estab-
lished in Platou should be upheld.'8 Chief Justice Nix stated that
the particularity requirement in warrants makes general searches
under them unconstitutional, prevents seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another and leaves nothing to the discretion of
the officer executing the warrant.4 The dissent also asserted that
the majority's reliance on Ross as authority was misplaced since
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)). In Reese, Justice Larsen cited
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Ybarra in support of his contention that a search of a visitor's
unworn personal effects on a premises being searched pursuant to a valid search warrant are
within the scope of the warrant. Id. at 911. In Ybarra, the majority held that a search of a
patron in a bar where a search warrant for drugs was being executed was unlawful. 444 U.S.
at 96. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, stated: "an absolute bar to searching persons not
named in the warrant would often allow a person to frustrate the search simply by placing
the contraband in his pocket." Id. at 102. Ybarra is discussed in greater detail, infra.
44. 549 A.2d at 912.
45. Id. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
46. 549 A.2d at 912. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. 549 A.2d at 912-13. The dissenting opinion was filed by Chief Justice Nix and was
joined by Justice Zappala. Id at 912.
48. Id. See supra, note 32 and accompanying text.
49. Id. (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)). Marron was previ-
ously quoted in Platou, where it was stated that: "The requirement that warrants shall
particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible
and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to
be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." 275 U.S. at
196. Marron held that seizure of a ledger showing inventories of liquors, receipts, expenses,
etc. and of utility bills was not authorized under a warrant to search premises for intoxicat-
ing liquors. Id. at 196. Marron is discussed in greater detail in the history section, infra.
1990
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Ross dealt with probable cause and not the particularity of a
search as described in a warrant.50
Chief Justice Nix placed great significance on the wording of the
applicable constitutional provisions.51 The Justice stated that even
though the Pennsylvania Constitution and the U.S. Constitution
both require probable cause and particularly for the issuance of a
search warrant, the order in which these two requirements are ad-
dressed differs.52 The United States Constitution addresses proba-
ble cause first, while the Pennsylvania Constitution addresses par-
ticularity first.53 The dissent further contended that this suggests
that the Pennsylvania constitutional formulation requires that par-
ticularly and probable cause should be given at least equal impor-
tance. 4 Chief Justice Nix also suggested that merely because prob-
able cause exists in a certain factual situation, the requirement of
particularly should not be lessened.5 5 The Justice further asserted
that the Pennsylvania Constitution required both particularity and
probable cause to be considered as separate and distinct factors in
determining whether the constitutional mandate has been fol-
lowed.56 The dissent contended that the majority failed to appreci-
ate this point. 7
The dissent concluded that Commonwealth v. Platou should be
reaffirmed. 8 The dissenters argued that allowing police to extend
the scope of a search warrant to include property and persons not
described in the warrant erodes rights guaranteed to the citizens of
Pennsylvania.59 The dissenters also contended that even if the
search of Reese's jacket was permissible under the United States
Constitution it was impermissible under the Pennsylvania
50. 549 A.2d at 912. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part, "no warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides in
pertinent part, "no warrant to search a place or to seize any person or things shall issue
without describing them as nearly as may be nor without probable cause." Pa. Const. art. I §
8.
54. 549 A.2d at 912.
55. Id. Chief Justice Nix states that the particularity requirement is not merely an
appendage within the Pennsylvania constitutional formulation. Id.
56. Id. Chief Justice Nix asserts it would be inconsistent with the Pennsylvania consti-
tutional formulation to give the requirement for probable cause precedence over the require-
ment for particularity. Id.
57. Id. at 912.
58. Id. at 913. See supra, note 32-35 and accompanying text.
59. 549 A.2d at 913.
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Constitution. 0
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution re-
quires that warrants be issued only upon a showing of probable
cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." The Pennsylvania Constitution
provides similar protections.6 2 By requiring probable cause, and
particularly for search warrants to issue, the fourth amendment
seeks to prevent the evils promulgated by the general warrants uti-
lized in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies. 3
The Fourth Amendment demand for specificity as to the subject
of a search was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Marron v. United States."' In that case, Marron was indicted and
charged with various offenses against the National Prohibition Act
along with maintaining a nuisance of 1249 Polk Street, San Fran-
cisco.65 Prohibition agents had obtained a search warrant particu-
larly describing the things to be seized, namely intoxicating liquors
60. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched,and the person or things to be seized. Id.
62. Pa. Const. art. I § 8. Article 1 section 8 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Id.
63. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1885). Justice Bradley
writing for the court in Boyd held that a custom revenue law which required compulsory
production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him was an unreasona-
ble search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He stated that to
ascertain reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment contempo-
rary or recent history need only be examined. The Court detailed the colonies resistance to
writs of assistance whereby revenue officers were empowered at their discretion to search
suspected places for smuggled goods. The Court stated that this practice was also prevalent
in England in the form of the general warrant. Justice Bradley further stated that argu-
ments and resistance about writs of assistance were perhaps the most prominent event
which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to England. Justice Bradley also stated that
these arguments were fresh in the memories of those who achieved our independence, estab-
lished our form of government and subsequently drafted the Fourth Amendment. Id. See
Mascolo, Specificity Requirements for Warrants under the Fourth Amendment: Defining
the Zone of Privacy, 73 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1968). General warrants may be defined as: a war-
rant that does not specify by name or description the persons to be arrested, or leaves blank
spaces for such name or description to be filled in after the arrest, or does not specify with
particularity either the place to be searched or the property to be seized. Id. at 2, n. 3.
64. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
65. 275 U.S. at 193.
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and articles for their manufacture.6 6 For a time prior to the search
on October 1, 1924, Marron was the lessee of the Polk Street ad-
dress . 7 At the time prohibition agents executed the warrant, Mar-
ron was not present, another defendant, Birdsall, was present and
was placed under arrest.6 8 While conducting the search, agents
found bills for utilities for the Polk Street address in Marron's
name. 9 They also found ledgers showing inventories of liquors, re-
ceipts and expenses.7 0 The bills and ledgers were seized for
evidence.
71
After indictment and before trial, Marron applied to the court
for return of the ledger and bills and to suppress evidence concern-
ing them.72 The application to suppress was denied and subse-
quently the bills and ledger were introduced in evidence at trail
against Marron.73
Marron was convicted of conspiring to commit various offenses
against the National Prohibition Act, including the maintenance of
a nuisance at the Polk Street address, and thereafter the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 74 In arguing for the re-
versal of his conviction, Marron contended that the seizure of the
ledger and bills violated the Fourth Amendment because they were
not described in the warrant and he was not arrested with them on
his person.75 The government, on the other hand, contended that
the seizure was justified either as incident to the execution of the
search warrant, or as a search incident to the arrest of Birdsall.76
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 194.
69. Id. Evidence showed that the place was used for retailing alcoholic beverages. Ap-
proximately one dozen patrons were present some being furnished with alcoholic beverages.
Large quantities of liquor were also found. Id.
70. Id. The ledgers revealed gifts to police officers and other things related to the busi-
ness. Id.
71. Id. The return made on the search warrant showed only the seizure of intoxicating
liquors. It did not show the discovery or seizure of the ledger or bills. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. At trial, evidence showed that Marron made entries in the ledger and he was
concerned as a partner in selling alcoholic beverages. Id.
74. Id. at 193. After being convicted in the Southern Division of the Northern District
of California Marron obtained review in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and secured reversal and a new trial. He was again found guilty and his con-
viction was affirmed. Id.
75. Id. at 194. Marron contended further that the seizure of the ledger and bills vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment rights since the Fifth Amendment protects every person against
incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through search and seizure made in violation
of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
76. Id.
372 Vol. 28:363
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The Supreme Court, in reversing, stated that general searches
violate certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment." The Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting laws
providing for issuance and execution of search warrants, was dili-
gent to limit seizures to things particularly described in the war-
rant.78 The Marron Court concluded that the seizure of the ledger
and bills was not authorized by the warrant.79 In reaching the
above conclusion, the Marron Court stated that the requirement of
particularly in the issuance of warrants makes general searches
under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under
a warrant describing another.80 The Court also reasoned that noth-
ing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as
to what is to be taken.81
The requirement for particularity as to the subject of a search
was re-examined by the United States Supreme Court in Ybarra v.
Illinois.82 In Ybarra, police acting on an informant's statements,
obtained a warrant authorizing the search of a tavern and the per-
son of the bartender for evidence of possession of controlled sub-
stances.8 3 Upon executing the search warrant, officers announced
that all patrons present would be searched for weapons.8 4 Upon the
first cursory search of Ybarra, the officer felt a cigarette pack with
objects in it. 5 A second, more thorough search revealed that the
cigarette pack contained heroin."
Ybarra was subsequently indicted and convicted of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance by the Illinois courts.87 The
77. Id. at 195.
78. Id. at 196. For example, title Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 provides that
a search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause supported by affidavit naming or
describing the person and particularly describing property and places to be searched. Id.
79. 275 U.S. at 198. The Court however upheld the seizure of the ledger and bills as
justified under the government's contention that the seizure was the result of a search inci-
dent to the arrest of defendant Birdsall. Id. at 199.
80. Id. at 196.
81. Id.
82. 444 U.S. 85 (1979). Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion as did Justice Rehnquist. Id.
83. Id. at 88.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 89. One officer proceeded to patdown each of the 9 to 13 patrons present. In
his first patdown of Ybarra the officer felt a cigarette pack with objects in it in Ybarra's
pants pocket. After searching the other patrons the officer returned to Ybarra and again
frisked him. On this second search the officer removed the cigarette pack and found six
tinfoil packets which later proved to contain heroin. Id.
87. Id. Ybarra's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the heroin was denied by the
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Illinois courts found that the search of Ybarra was authorized
under an Illinois statute allowing law enforcement officers to de-
tain and search any person on the premises while executing a
search warrant in order to protect the officers from attack, or to
prevent the disposal or concealment of things particularly de-
scribed in the warrant.8
An appeal followed to the United States Supreme Court.8 9 The
Court considered, inter alia, whether the search of Ybarra was au-
thorized under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments where of-
ficers, at the beginning of the search, had no probable cause to be-
lieve Ybarra was violating the law.9 0 The Court reasoned that the
complaint for the warrant did not allege that the tavern was fre-
quented by persons who illegally purchased drugs or that any pa-
trons were involved in illegal drug transactions. 1 The Court stated
that even though police had a valid search warrant for the prem-
ises supported by probable cause, the probable cause did not ex-
tend to Ybarra since search and seizure of a person must be sup-
ported by probable cause particularized to that person.2 The
Supreme Court declared that the requirement that probable cause
be particularized with respect to that person cannot be under-
mined merely because that person is present in the premises where
a valid search warrant is being executed."3 The Court concluded
that the probable cause that gave the officers the authority to
search the premises gave them no authority to invade the constitu-
tional protections possessed individually by each patron of the
tavern.94
Illinois Trial Court. Id. Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution must be excluded at trial. This
rule was made applicable to State Court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. 444 U.S. at 89. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ybarra's conviction holding
that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional in its application to the facts of this case.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. Id. at 90.
89. Id.
90. Id. Nowhere in the complaint were patrons of the tavern mentioned. Id.
91. Id. The search warrant complaint did not state that the informant had ever seen a
patron of the tavern purchase drugs from the bartender or any other person. Id.
92. Id. at 91. Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no move-
ments that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of a suspi-
cious nature to police officers. Id.
93. Id. The Court reasoned that police knew nothing in particular about Ybarra, other
than he was present, along with several other patrons, when police had reason to believe
that the bartender would have heroin for sale. The Court reasoned further that a person's
mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Id.
94. Id. Justice Stewart stated each patron who entered the tavern on March 1, 1976
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The Court, in Ybarra also considered the i3sue of whether the
subject search could have been justified as a frisk for weapons
under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio. 5 The Terry doctrine allows a
police officer to conduct a limited warrantless search of a person
they approach if the officer has a reasonable belief or suspicion
that the person may be armed or dangerous."6 The State con-
tended that since the first search of Ybarra was a reasonable frisk
for weapons under Terry, the subsequent search was justified since
there was now probable cause to believe Ybarra possessed narcot-
ics.9 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that the initial frisk of Ybarra
was not justified since there was no reasonable belief that he was
armed and presently dangerous. 8 The Court concluded that the
state was unable to articulate any specific fact that justified police
suspicion that Ybarra was armed and dangerous.9
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth
Amendment permitted searches of persons who were on the prem-
ises subject to a search warrant if police had a "reasonable belief"
that these persons were connected with the illegal activity or may
have been concealing or carrying away contraband. 100 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that the prevailing standard of probable
cause was the best compromise between the often conflicting inter-
ests of safeguarding citizens from unreasonable interferences and
effective law enforcement. 101 For the foregoing reasons the Court
concluded that the search of Ybarra and the seizure of what was in
his pocket contravened the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment,
was clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an unreasona-
ble seizure. Id.
95. Id. at 92. The case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), created a narrow exception
to the requirement of probable cause. The doctrine created by Terry allows law enforcement
officers to conduct limited warrantless searches for weapons. To justify these searches, the
doctrine requires that the officer: 1) observes suspicious activity that leads him to believe
criminal activity is taking place; 2) the officer reasonably believes he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous person; 3) the officer identifies himself and makes reasonable inquiries
of the suspect and 4) if the officer still believes he is in danger, he may conduct a limited
search for weapons. This doctrine lowers the probable cause standard for searches to one of
reasonable belief for the narrow purpose of protection of law enforcement officers. Id.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. 444 U.S. at 92. See supra, note 85 and accompanying text.
98. 444 U.S. at 92.
99. Id. at 93. Police upon entering the tavern did not recognize Ybarra as a person
with a criminal history and had no particular reason to believe Ybarra may have assaulted
them. Ybarra's hands were empty and he made no gestures or other movements that would
indicate he intended to assault the officers. Id.
100. Id. at 94.
101. Id. at 95-96.
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and accordingly, the Court reversed the Illinois court and re-
manded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
their opinion."0 '
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, would have upheld the
search of Ybarra by utilizing the Terry doctrine as authority.10 3
The Chief Justice reasoned that the majority overlooked the prac-
ticalities of the situation which confronted officers executing a
valid search warrant and unjustifiably narrowed the rule of
Terry." He further reasoned, that the Terry Court recognized
that a balance must be struck between the privacy interest of indi-
viduals and the safety of police officers in performing their duty.'0
Justice Rehnquist dissented stating that a search warrant is an-
ticipatory authorization and although police must offer a magis-
trate sufficient information to confine the search, they must leave
themselves enough flexibility to react reasonably to whatever situa-
tion confronts them when they begin their search.'0 6 Justice Rehn-
quist reasoned that an absolute bar to searching persons not
named in the warrant would too easily allow persons to frustrate a
search by placing contraband in their pocket.'0 7 Justice Rehnquist
admitted that persons do not forfeit their Fourth Amendment pro-
tections merely by being present during the execution of a search
warrant. However, Justice Rehnquist contended that the main con-
sideration should be whether, under all the circumstances, actions
of the police in executing the warrant were reasonable.'0 8 In judg-
ing reasonableness, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court should
balance the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the
search (or seizure) entailed.' 9 The Justice, in applying this scope/
justification test, opined that the search of Ybarra was reasonable
and that officers acting under the authority of a valid search war-
rant did not exceed the reasonable scope of the warrant by search-
ing Ybarra."10
102. Id. at 96.
103. Id. Burger, C.J., is joined in his dissent by Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J. Id.See
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. 444 U.S. at 96-97.
105. Id. at 97.
106. Id. at 102. Justice Rehnquist is joined in dissent by Burger, C.J. and Blackmun,
J. Id. at 98.
107. Id. at 102.
108. Id. at 104.
109. Id. at 105.
110. Id. at 110. Justice Rehnquist declares that although a frisk for weapons is a sub-
stantial intrusion into one's privacy, it was justified under the circumstances by the poten-
tial threat to the lives of the searching officers and innocent bystanders. He states the need
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In United States v. Ross,"' the Supreme Court again considered
the scope of a lawful search.112 The question presented in Ross,
was, when probable cause justified the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, did the scope of the search extend to every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may have concealed the object of the
search?
11 3
In Ross, District of Colombia police received information from
an informant that a described person was selling narcotics from
the trunk of a certain car parked at a certain place."" Police found
the car at the specified location and a short while later stopped the
car." ' The driver, Ross, who matched the informants description
was arrested after a search of the interior of the car produced a
pistol which was found in the glove compartment.'" Police using
Ross' keys opened the trunk and found a closed brown paper bag,
which upon opening, revealed heroin." 7 Subsequently, upon mak-
ing a thorough search at police headquarters, police found a zip-
pered pouch in the trunk and upon unzipping it, found $3,200 in
cash." No warrant for either search was obtained." 9
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute and his subsequent motion to suppress evidence of the her-
oin and cash was denied prior to trial.12 0 The evidence and cur-
rency were introduced in evidence at trial and Ross was convicted
in a Federal District Court of possession of heroin with intent to
distribute.2 '
for a search was determined by a neutral magistrate as required by the second clause of the
Fourth Amendment and the officers acted in an appropriate fashion in performing their
duties. Id.
111. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Justice Stevens delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Bur-
ger, C.J., and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, J.J. Blackmun, J. and Powell, J.
filed concurring opinions. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, Marshall, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, joined by Brennan, J., 456 U.S. at 799.
112. Id. at 800.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 801.
116. Id. After stopping the vehicle, Ross was ordered to get out of the car. Police
found a bullet on the car's front seat. A search of the interior of the car produced a pistol
found in the glove compartment. Id.
117. Id. Police then replaced the bag, closed the trunk and drove the car to headquar-
ters. A police laboratory later found the contents to be heroin. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Supreme Court held that
police can make a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains contraband. Id.




The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia
Circuit reversed, holding that while the officers had probable cause
to stop and search Ross' car-including the trunk-without a war-
rant, they should not have opened either the paper bag or the
leather pouch found in the trunk without first obtaining a
warrant.
122
On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which police may search a lawfully stopped vehicle when there is
probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere in
it.12 The Court in Carroll v. United States,124 had previously au-
thorized warrantless searches of vehicles if there was probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. 21 The Ross
Court, however, stated that to resolve the issue presented it was
necessary to determine the scope of the search that was authorized
by the exception to the warrant requirement set forth in Carroll.2 6
The Court reasoned that a lawful search of a premises extended to
the entire area which the object may be found not limited by sepa-
rate acts of entry or opening. 27 The Supreme Court stated for ex-
ample that, a warrant that authorized the search of a home for
illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, drawers
and containers in which the weapon might be found.
128
The Court further reasoned that when a legitimate search is
under way and its purpose and limits are precisely defined, nice
distinctions between closets, drawers and containers give way to
the governments interest in the prompt and efficient completion of
the task at hand.' 29 The Supreme Court, thus concluded, that once
probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, the scope of a
search is defined by the object of the search, not by the nature of
the container in which contraband is secreted.' The judgment of
the Court of Appeals which reversed Ross' conviction for posses-
sion -of heroin with intent to distribute was thereby reversed and
the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
122. Id. at 802.
123. Id. at 800.
124. 267 U. S. 132 (1925). See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. Ross, 456 U.S. at 801.
126. Id. at 817.
127. Id. at 820.
128. Id. at 821.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 824. The Supreme Court opined that once probable cause justifies the
search of a vehicle, the search may include every part of the vehicle and its contents that
may conceal the object of the search. Id. at 825.
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Supreme Court's opinion.' 3 '
In Commonwealth v. Reece, 13 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considered the extent of a search authorized by a warrant. 133 In
Reece, police obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of an
apartment where a 'pot party' was to take place.134 While police
were executing the warrant, Reece knocked on the door which was
slightly ajar and entered the premises.'3 5 Upon entry Reece was
greeted by a police officer who read Reece his "Miranda" warnings,
searched his person and found a small amount of marijuana in his
coat pocket, and arrested Reece.13 6 On the basis of the marijuana
found in Reece's coat a search warrant was secured for his apart-
ment and subsequently additional marijuana was found.1
37
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the search
of Reece's person was within the scope of the warrant to search the
apartment."3 ' The Court reasoned that an arrest without a warrant
may be made only upon probable cause.' 39 The Court stated that
since the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make the
initial arrest, the search of Reece's clothing and person incident to
the arrest was likewise unlawful. 4 °
The Court further stated that police had no information con-
cerning Reece before he entered the apartment and neither his de-
meanor nor conduct suggested that he was on drugs.4 Justice Ea-
gen declared that a person's mere presence at the scene of a crime
131. Id.
132. 437 Pa. 422, 263 A. 2d 463 (1970). Justice Egan delivered the Court's opinion in
which Justice Jones concurred. Id.
133. Reece, 263 A.2d at 465.
134. Id. at 464.
135. Id.
136. Id. Approximately fifteen people arrived at the apartment while police were exe-
cuting the search warrant. All of these persons were searched by police and charges were
brought against those found to be in possession of drugs. The apartment search revealed
only a minute residue of amphetamine powder. Id.
137. Id. at 465. Subsequently Reece filed a motion to suppress the evidence, i.e., the
marijuana seized by police. The motion was denied, Reece was found guilty at trial, judg-
ment was affirmed by the Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
allocatur. Id. at 464.
138. Id. at 465.
139. Id. Probable cause is said to exist when facts and circumstances are sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that petitioner had committed or was committing an
offense. Id. at note 4 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).
140. Reece, 263 A.2d at 465. Justice Eagan stated that it is established beyond ques-
tion that as an incident to a lawful arrest, the person of the individual arrested may be




is not probable cause for an arrest."" Furthermore, he stated, drug
possession is unique to the individual and presence at the scene of
a crime should not implicate a person. 4 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could also not justify the
search as a Terry stop and frisk stating that the officer was unable
to articulate any particular fact from which he could reasonably
infer that Reece was armed and dangerous, as required by Terry.""'
The Court then concluded that since the initial search of Reece
could not be justified, the marijuana from his coat and subsequent
search of his apartment could not be admitted into evidence
against him.'
4 5
In Commonwealth v. Platou,48 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
again considered the scope of a search authorized by a search war-
rant for the premises.1 47 In Platou, police obtained a valid search
warrant to search an apartment for drugs. 4" The apartment owner,
Wander, informed police that Platou was a guest in the apart-
ment. 49 Prior to this time police had no knowledge of Platou's ex-
istence.'50 Upon executing the search warrant police "announced
that they had authority to search everything in the apartment.'
5
1
At this time Platou claimed ownership of two suitcases lying on
the floor.' 52 Despite being put on notice that the suitcase did not
belong to Wander police searched them and arrested Platou after
finding an ounce of marijuana.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the
142. Id. at 466. The Court stated that the only possible basis for Reece's arrest was his
appearance on the scene where a 'pot party' was expected to occur. Id.
143. Id. The court reasoned that guilt by association was the rationale for the arrest
and that this is unacceptable. Id.
144. Id. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
145. Reece, 263 A.2d at 466.
146. 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973).
147. 312 A.2d at 31. Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion with Jones, C.J., dis-
senting. Id.
148. Id. Police had obtained an arrest warrant for Platou's friend Wander and a
search warrant for Wander's apartment on the basis of a sale of marijuana by Wander to
police. Id.
149. Id. Wander was arrested at his place of employment and accompanied police to




153. Id. Platou moved to suppress the marijuana seized from his effects. Motion was
denied and he was convicted of possession of marijuana and sentenced to serve two years
probation and pay a $500 fine. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment and subsequently
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur. Id.
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seizure of marijuana from Platou's suitcases violated his rights to
be free from unreasonsable searches and seizures.154 The Supreme
Court stated that a warrant only authorized a search of the place
or thing for which an affidavit of probable cause has been submit-
ted.155 The Court that reasoned that the officers who executed such
a warrant could not increase its scope by searching things that did
not belong to or were not under control of the person named in the
warrant.15 Allowing such a search, the Court found, denied Platou
his Fourth Amendment right that required a magistrate to decide
if probable cause existed before a lawful search could occur. 157 The
Court also stated that the Fourth Amendment requirement of par-
ticularly was offended since the police and, a fortiori, the issuing
magistrate had no knowledge of Platou prior to the search and
thus could not have particularly described his effects when apply-
ing for the search warrant. 5 8
The Platou Court further reasoned that there was no constitu-
tional difference between a search of a guest's person as in Reece
and a search of a guest's personal effects not on the person, as both
were entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. '59 The Court also
recognized that Platou and his effects did not lose their Fourth
Amendment protection when Platou entered the apartment of an-
other when a search warrant was being executed.16 0 The Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment protections continued so long
as a person sought to preserve his effects as private and main-
tained a reasonable expectation of privacy, or until their owner
meaningfully abdicated control or responsibility.16 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Platou concluded that an
154. Id. at 32. See supra note 61-64. Id.
155. Id. Rule 2003 of PA. R. CRIM. PROC. requires application for search warrants to be
supported by affidavits of probable cause. Id.
156. Id. The Supreme Court stated that if the search of the suitcases was not author-
ized by the search warrant, the Commonwealth would have to prove an exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement existed to justify the warrantless search. The
Court cited examples of exceptions when warrantless searches are permitted: incident to a
valid arrest, officers protection, plain view and consent. The Court further stated that all
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, unless the search falls within a recognized
exception. Since the Commonwealth attempted to justify the search as being authorized by
the search warrant, the exceptions were not considered further by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. See Platou, 312 A.2d at 32 n.5.
157. 312 A.2d at 32.
158. Id. at 33.
159. Id. at 34.
160. Id.
161. Id. The Court could not sanction this type of search stating that guilt by associa-
tion was the only rationale supporting it and that this standard is impermissible. Id.
1990
Duquesne Law Review
officer executing a search warrant had no right to extend its scope
to persons or things not particularly described in the warrant.162
The Court thus concluded that the search of Platou's suitcases was
unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible. 6 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Reese, explicitly
overruling Platou,6 4 expands the scope of a search warrant to
property that is part of the general content of a room being
searched and is a plausible repository for the object of the
search.' The Court could have reached the same conclusion with-
out explicitly overruling Platou since factual distinctions allow
both cases to be reconciled. In Platou, the court noted that it was
undisputed that the apartment's occupant had no control over
Platou's effects and stressed that a visitor's belongings retain their
constitutional protections until their owner meaningfully abdicates
control or responsibility.16 6 This suggests that the court would only
forbid the search of a visitor's effects when the occupant had no
opportunity to utilize the visitor's belongings as a repository for
the items particularly described in the warrant. In Reese, it was
not undisputed that Cosgrove, the apartment's occupant, had no
control over Reese's jacket prior to the search. Both Cosgrove and
Reese were in the kitchen where the jacket was located when the
search began. 16 7 The Reese court could have reasoned that given
this opportunity to be utilized as a hiding place for contraband,
Reese, meaningfully abdicated control of the jacket and the jacket
lost its constitutional protection. This is consistent with the court's
reasoning in Platou.
The Reese court cites the dissenting opinion in Ybarra to make
the point that an absolute bar to searching persons not named in
the warrant would often allow a person to frustrate a search by
placing contraband in his pocket.16  This suggests that the Reese
court would condone the search of a visitor's person because of his
mere presence on the scene when a search warrant is being exe-
cuted. However, on further analysis the court's opinion is more
consistent with the Ybarra court's majority opinion. 6 9 The United
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 32-35 and accompanying text.
165. 549 A.2d at 912.
166. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
168. 549 A.2d at 910.
169. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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States Supreme Court's majority opinion in Ybarra held that an
evidence search of a person, because of his mere presence on the
premises when a search warrant was being executed, was not prob-
able cause to have searched his person and contravened his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 170 The Reese court also stated
that a person's mere presence on a premises when a search warrant
was being executed did not, without more, justify a search of that
person under the authority of the search warrant. Rather, the
Court found this type of search to be constitutionally impermissi-
ble. 17 This suggests that the search and seizure of a person must
have been supported by probable cause particularized to that per-
son. This standard of probable cause will not be lessened merely
because of the person's presence on the scene when probable cause
existed to search and seize another or to search the premises.
The court in Reese is careful to maintain a distinction between
the search of a visitor's person and the search of a visitor's per-
sonal property (property which is not on the person) located on
premises where a search warrant was being executed.1 72 The Court
recognized this distinction, declaring that a visitor could have frus-
trated a search by placing contraband among his unworn personal
effects or by announcing ownership of various articles of clothing
and containers in order to place those items beyond the scope of
the warrant.17 a The Court specifically does not mention contraband
that may be concealed on the person and would likewise frustrate
the search. In making this distinction Justice Larsen balanced the
needs of effective completion of the search and the practicalities of
executing search warrants against the invasion of an individual's
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Striking this balance, the Court declared that the search
of a visitor's person is a substantial invasion of an individual's con-
stitutional rights. This invasion of individual rights was not offset
by the need to search and therefore, the search was constitution-
ally impermissible. Conversely, the Court declared that the search
of a visitor's personal property (property which was not on the per-
son) was necessary for the effective completion of the search be-
cause of the practicalities involved in executing search warrants. In
170. Id.
171. 549 A.2d at 910.
172. Id. The Court reasoned there is a constitutional difference between the search of
a visitor's person and the search of a visitor's personal property (property which is not on
the person) located on premises where a search warrant is being executed. Id.
173. Id. at 911.
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this case the Court reasoned that the invasion of Reese's constitu-
tional rights was offset by the necessity for effective completion of
the search. Therefore, the search of Reese's jacket was constitu-
tionally permissible.
The Reese court recognized the difficult position an opposite rul-
ing would have on law enforcement's efforts to execute search war-
rants. Justice Larsen declared it would be impossible for police to
effectively search a premises if they were not permitted to search a
visitor's unworn personal effects.17 In making this ruling, the court
suggests they are not willing to further hinder an already difficult
effort to police narcotics traffic. The Court would also not condone
any rule that would erect a barrier preventing the effective and
legitimate execution of search warrants.
Chief Justice Nix, in dissent declared the court's ruling effectu-
ally takes away rights guaranteed to the citizens of this Common-
wealth. 175 The dissent, however, does not suggest any alternative
resolution that would preserve an individual's rights while allowing
for the effective completion of searches.
In Reese, the Court declared that police were not prohibited
from searching a visitor's personal property, not on the person, lo-
cated on a premises in which a search warrant was being executed,
when the property is part of the general content of the premises
and is a plausible repository for the object of that search.1 76 While
seeming to expand the scope of a search warrant, the Court was
careful in its holding to place limits on this expansion. Justice Lar-
sen maintained the distinction between a visitor's personal prop-
erty on the person and a visitor's personal property that becomes a
part of the general content of the premises being searched. The
question of when a visitor's personal property becomes a part of
the general content of the premises remains open for future inter-
pretation by the Court. The Court's holding also limited the search
of a visitor's personal property to that which is a plausible reposi-
tory for the object of that search. As the Court stated they did not
suggest that police in this case could have properly searched
Reese's jacket had they been looking for an elephant.1 7 This ele-
ment of the Court's holding is also open to future interpretation
that will most likely revolve around specific fact patterns.
The Court in Reese, balanced the competing interests of the in-
174. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
175. 549 A.2d at 912.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 911, n.2.
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dividual's Constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search
and law enforcement's necessity for effective completion of the
search. Although any search may be taken as an invasion of an
individual's constitutional rights, the balance struck by the Court
satisfied the competing interests as nearly as possible. Search and
seizure, by its nature is an area of the law that is being constantly
reviewed by the Courts. Search and seizure concepts such as prob-
able cause, reasonableness, general content of the premises, and
plausible repository are not subject to precise definition in legisla-
tion. Courts are thus charged with the interpretation of these con-
cepts and the necessity of case-by-case decision making cannot be
completely avoided. In this area courts will continue in their at-
tempts to balance the competing interests of government's need to
search against the invasion of an individuals constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Frank H. Bole

